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Abstract
This paper analyses the so-called 'Draft Treaty of Amsterdam' of 19 June 1997, focusing on the
changes concerning the institutions and the decision-making procedures. It is argued that the sum of
envisaged changes will considerably alter the institutional balance between the three main actors,
i.e. the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. The latter, in particular, will have
an increased influence vis-à-vis the Commission (via the investiture procedure) and a greater say
vis-à-vis the Council (in the codecision procedure). With regard to the internal organisation of the
three institutions, too, remarkable changes are on the horizon. The roles of the Committee of the
Regions and of the national parliaments in EC policy-making have been consolidated and clarified
respectively. We conclude with an overall assessment of the results of the IGC 1996/97. The paper
includes a synopsis of all Treaty changes in the procedural field, and a graph presenting the new
codecision procedure.
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EG-Entscheidungsfindung wurde konsolidiert bzw. geklärt. Wir schließen mit einer Bewertung der
Ergebnisse der Regierungekonferenz 1996/97. Teil des Papiers ist eine Synopse aller
Vertragsänderungen im Verfahrensbereich und ein Schaubild des neuen
Mitentscheidungsverfahrens.
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I. Introduction
In this paper, we shall analyse the so-called 'Draft Treaty of Amsterdam' of 19 June 1997(1), focusing
on the changes concerning the institutions and the decision-making procedures. It will be argued that
the sum of envisaged changes will considerably alter the institutional balance between the three main
actors, i.e. the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. The latter, in particular, will
have an increased influence vis-à-vis the Commission (via the investiture procedure) and a greater
say vis-à-vis the Council (in the codecision procedure). With regard to the internal organisation of
the three institutions, too, remarkable changes are on the horizon. The roles of the Committee of the
Regions and of the national parliaments in EC policy-making have been consolidated and clarified
respectively. We conclude with an overall assessment of the results of the IGC 1996/97.
II. The New Codecision Procedure: Towards an Equal Footing
The reform of the codecision procedure is to be considered as one of the major results of the IGC.
The following changes were agreed on (see also the Figure 1):
1 of 28 26.10.97 19:05
EIoP: Text 1997-015: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-015.htmIf the Council agrees to the EP's amendments in the 1st reading already, it may adopt the act at
this very early stage. Given the fact that carrying the procedure on to the (cumbersome and
time-consuming) conciliation procedure stage is rather unpopular among the MEPs as well as
the ministers, officials from the EP consider this a major change in so far as the MEPs will be
inclined to draft their amendments carefully, trying to anticipate the Council's views on the
issue in order to get its approval already at this early stage(2). 
If, in turn, the EP approves the Council's common position in the 2nd reading, the act is
deemed to be adopted without being referred back to the Council. 
If, in the 2nd reading, the EP does not take a position within three months, the act is also
deemed to be adopted in the version of the Council's common position; this is the last
remaining imbalance between the two 'chambers' since the decision finally taken would in this
case not necessarily reflect a jointly agreed text. 
The EP can reject the common position right away during the 2nd reading, i.e. it has not to
notify to the Council its intention to reject in advance. 
If, in the 2nd reading, the Council agrees to the EP's amendments, the act is also deemed to be
adopted without any further formal decision. 
There is still a 3rd reading, but it was changed in such a way that the Council may no longer
resume its original common position after the failure of the conciliation committee; this was
one of the main criticisms to the original codecision procedure. 
Various new time limits were introduced to assure that the period between the EP's 2nd
reading and the outcome of the whole procedure may not take longer than 9 ½ months; only
the 1st reading will be without time limits(3). Nevertheless, the experience of codecision tells
us that due to the existing time limits it is already the shortest procedure available, despite the
possibility of three readings in both chambers(4).
These changes show that the EP came very close to what it had asked for in the IGC. In fact, the
changes eliminate the procedural imbalances between the two major players, i.e. the Council and
Parliament, to a very large extent. Remaining differences can be assimilated to a useful distribution
of roles, while the overall political weight of the two institutions within the codecision procedure
may now be considered equal. Furthermore it can be argued that the last formal inequality, i.e. the
need for Parliament to pronounce itself on the Council's common position within a reasonable period,
is only a 'whip in the window' with a view to an effective internal organisation.(5) It is however
noteworthy that the new wording of Article 189b [= 251 new](6) TEC still lacks a similar provision
in the case of the Council not acting within the time limit of three months in the second reading: if
the Council fails to reach a decision on the EP's amendments in time, the procedure simply comes to
an illegal halt(7), but the legislative act is not deemed to be adopted in the EP's version. One has to
admit, however, that at this stage of the legislative procedure the Commission's opinion has a role to
play. Therefore, it would not be obvious what the latest version of the text would be, either that of the
EP or possibly an amended version by the Commission. In this perspective, strict equality between
the two legislative chambers would not offer an adequate solution to the peculiarity of the triangular
institutional balance.
Against this background, we conclude that the reform of codecision finally puts the Euro-Parliament
on an essentially equal footing with the Council (as far as this procedure is concerned). Considering
that this procedure will be applied in many more cases than before, the 1996/97 IGC is indeed a
major step towards a system based on bicameral parliamentary democracy at the EC level. It is
interesting to note that the Treaty language did not take into account this gradual change from a
Council centred to a bi-cameral system: While in the Single European Act the formula „the Council
shall ... in cooperation with the European Parliament adopt" was used, the Maastricht Treaty does not
mention the EP in most cases: „the Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to
in Article 189b ..., adopt...."(8). The Amsterdam Treaty is thus not going to change the remaining
imbalance in the Treaty language although the titles of the legislative acts on the basis of Article
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III. The EP's New Competences: Towards Parliamentary
Democracy
The EP started out as a purely consultative body composed of representatives delegated from the
national parliaments. Over the last decades, it saw its powers extended with each major Treaty
reform. In the aftermath of the first direct election in 1979, the EP itself gave an important impetus
for the 1986 Single European Act which introduced both the cooperation and the assent procedures
with its 'Draft Treaty on European Union' (although the latter was not as such accepted by the
governments). Nevertheless, pure consultation was kept as an alternative modus of EP involvement
for many areas of European policy-making. The Maastricht Treaty continued along these lines by
adding yet another procedure. 'Codecision' under Art 189b [= 251 new] TEC gave further-reaching
(although not yet: equal) powers to the parliamentary EC chamber, but was far from representing the
one and only standard procedure. Resulting from this incremental reform process was a patch-work
style landscape of EC decision-making: for each and every single case, one out of approx. 20
variants(9) of the four main procedures would apply. Neither of them, however, fulfilled the criteria
of putting the EP on an equal footing with the governments represented in the Council. Therefore, the
EP's demands for the 1996/97 IGC focused not only on improving codecision (see above II.) but also
on making it the single standard procedure in all EC law-making.
Table 1
With a view to the extension of EP competences (and other procedural changes), our synopsis in
Table 1 presents an overall picture of the IGC output as agreed in Amsterdam. In short, no uniform
decision procedure was established, yet again. Among the numerous specific changes, we would like
to highlight the following points:
In the TEU, the new Article Fa gives the EP an additional right to assent, i.e. when the Council
determines a breach of the Union's principles by a member state. By contrast, there is still mostly no
involvement, or only consultation, in the 2nd and 3rd pillars of the Union: With regard to some areas
of the 3rd pillar(10) a special consultation procedure will apply that is already known from one case
in the 1st pillar, namely the conclusion of international agreements(11): the Council may lay down a
time limit (which shall be no less than three months) for the delivery of the EP opinion; in contrast to
the ordinary consultation procedure, the Council may act without this opinion if not delivered in
time(12). In those areas which will be 'communautarized', i.e. transferred from the 3rd to the 1st
pillar(13), the EP will not be involved at all or only on a consultative basis during the five years after
the entry into force of the new Treaty. After five years, the competence to harmonise the rules and
procedures concerning visa will automatically be transferred to codecision, whereas for the rest of the
decisions taken under the new title on free movement of persons this transfer has to be decided
unanimously by the Council after consultation of the EP(14).
In those areas which are already covered by the TEC, the reform did not bring about a single
legislative procedure, either. The state of affairs after Amsterdam can be summarised in the
following five points:
(1) In some central issues where the Amsterdam Treaty introduces new provisions or amends existing
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cooperation(15); measures against discrimination(16); most decisions on asylum/immigration(17);
also parts of the social and R&D policies.
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With regard to such articles which remained unchanged by the Amsterdam Treaty, three provisions
should be pointed out: (i) The main legal basis for action in the field of agricultural policy, Article 43
[= 37 new] TEC, will also in the future provide for EP consultation only. However, the provision on
public health(18) was changed to encompass areas which were previously ruled under Article 43
TEC, i.e. veterinary medicine and phytosanitary measures. Since those decisions are already being
taken according to the codecision procedure, we may conclude that the EP has now at least 'a foot in
the door' to become a decisive co-legislator in the agricultural field. Still, in the important area of the
common agricultural market organisations, the Council acts after having consulted the Parliament
only(19). This is particularly deplorable since in this area, neither the EP nor the national
parliaments(20) have a say with regard to the content or the budget of the policy. (ii) Another
important area where the EP is still involved on a consultative basis only is the harmonisation of
legislation concerning indirect taxes, such as turnover taxes and excise duties(21). (iii) Finally,
Article 235 [= 308 new] TEC remains unchanged. It allows the Council to adopt legislation that
cannot be based on more specific competences but nevertheless is „necessary to attain, in the course
of the operation of the common market, [if] one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty
has not provided the necessary powers". This is the so-called 'subsidiary competence' provision
which has been the legal basis for many important legislative acts, such as the 1976 Equal Treatment
Directive(22).
(2) The cooperation procedure has been replaced by codecision in most cases, but not for EMU. It
should be reminded here that 'cooperation' gives the EP no veto power.
(3) Although codecision applies to only 8 out of 36 new competences attributed to the EC by the
Amsterdam Treaty (see Table 1), there are 22 (23)(23) new issues under codecision which come in
addition to the 15(24) set out in the Maastricht Treaty. In future, the EP will thus be a co-legislator
under 37 provisions altogether; among those areas are central legislative powers of the Union such as
most common market related provisions and at least some types of decisions within the majority of
all other policy areas [see however pt. (1) and (2) above as well as (4) and (5) below].
(4) There are, however, also new cases of non-involvement of the EP: e.g. when decisions are taken
on further member states joining a 'closer cooperation' among others(25); on emergency measures
related to immigration(26); on recommendations on employment policy(27); on the implementation
of social partner agreements in social affairs(28); on adaptation or supplementing of R&D
programmes(29); on the suspension of rights deriving from TEC for a Member state which is in
breach of fundamental principles of the Union(30). In particular, international agreements are an area
where the EP has only a limited role to play in the day-to-day decision-making: except for association
agreements under Article 238 [= 310 new] TEC, the EP's consultation is not formally based on the
Treaty when the Council concludes (Article 228 [= 300 new] para. 2 TEC) or suspends(31) an
agreement(32), but on a voluntary basis (the so-called Luns/Westerterp procedure). Also in the field
of economic policy, Parliament is often only informed of decisions taken by the Council(33). 
(5) It is noteworthy that no changes were agreed on the EP participation in the budgetary procedure,
although this issue had been explicitly put on the IGC agenda by the Interinstitutional Agreement of
1993.(34) Thus, in financial matters, the EC system remains quite sui generis.
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remind that few had expected the IGC to result in a 'land slide' regarding EP competences in EC/EU
decision-making. Nevertheless, significant improvements were agreed. In our view, codecision will
from now on be perceived as the standard procedure, consultation or cooperation will be considered
as the exception of the rule only. This will most likely not only change the public perception of the
EP's powers vis-à-vis the Council but also make it easier to switch to codecision as the single
legislative procedure in the next IGC.
Just as many national parliaments, the EP is involved to a lesser extent in foreign policy (e.g.
international agreements and CSFP in general); monetary policy (e.g. when defining the statute of the
European Central Bank); classic governmental activities (e.g. emergency measures, amending
programmes during execution); and where corporatist patterns prevail (e.g. social policy). But still,
there are also matters where the Council acts as a genuine legislator without Parliament as a
co-legislator (e.g. in the field of agricultural policy; in the area of the 3rd pillar, whether
'communautarized' or not; and with regard to some decisions in the field of social policy). One of the
major stakes of the EP, namely that Article 189b TEC applies wherever the Community institutions
act as legislators(35), was thus not fulfilled entirely but to a very large extent.
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In sharp contrast to national parliaments, however, the Euro-MPs have only a limited say in
quasi-constitutional matters just as decisions regarding flexible cooperation and the suspension of
rights deriving from the Treaties. Most strikingly, the EP is not involved at all in amendments to the
'constitution', i.e. Treaty reforms(36). On the one hand, the political system of the EC/EU thus
resembles national systems in many instances. On the other, some very specific features still prevail.
Might there be a coherent hypothesis to explain these countervailing evidences? It seems plausible to
argue that with every IGC the EC/EU decision-making structure comes a little closer to a federal
state model with a parliamentary and a state chamber. But this statement needs the qualification that
it is a so far unique type of federal decision-making structure which results in the European case.
IV. The Future of the Commission: Towards a European
Government?
The Amsterdam Treaty deals with the Commission in two instances, i.e. the reform of its internal
structure (A.) and the investiture procedure (B.). This prompts the question whether the intended
changes will affect the political position of the Commission in a way that transforms its role into the
direction of a supranational government.
A. The New Internal Structure: Towards Personalisation?
There was much debate about how to make the European Commission more efficient, more coherent,
and able to meet the challenges of a further enlarged Union. In particular the reduction of the size of
the college of Commissioners was widely discussed(37). The issue was 'settled' by postponement:
Article 1 of the Protocol 'on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union',
annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, envisages that, at the date of entry into force of the first
enlargement of the Union, the Commission will comprise only one national per Member state. This
new distribution of seats in the Commission is, however, conditional: the five larger states would
give up their 2nd Commissioner only if the issue of the reweighting of votes in the Council of
Ministers was settled by the same date. Furthermore, this 'agreement' is also qualified by the words
„notwithstanding Article 157 (1) of the TEC" [= 213 new]. This paragraph fixes the number of 20 for
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unanimous decision. In our view, this clause may be interpreted in a way that the present size may be
kept or even increased by a decision of the Council, e.g. when only a small number of countries (up
to five) will join the EU in the first wave . Article 2 of the same Protocol envisages a new IGC with a
view to carry out 'a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Treaties on the composition and
functioning of the institutions', 'at least one year before the membership of the European Union
exceeds twenty'. In this perspective, the 'agreement' on one Commissioner per Member state is
indeed no agreement but a simple postponement of the decision on the size of the Commission.
In the eyes of many, the key question had been less the sheer number of Commissioners than the
internal organisation of the Commission. In this respect several changes were decided:
A new first subparagraph of Article 163 [= 219 new] TEC strengthens the role of the
Commission President. It reads: „The Commission shall work under the political guidance of
its President." In the second subparagraph of the Declaration to the Final Act 'on the
organisation and functioning of the Commission', this leading role of the President is further
qualified: „... the President of the Commission must enjoy broad discretion in the allocation of
tasks within the College, as well as in any reshuffling of those tasks during a Commission's
term of office." 
The Conference acknowledges and supports the Commission's intention to prepare a
'reorganisation of tasks within the College' 'in order to ensure an optimum division between
conventional portfolios and specific tasks'.(38) This reorganisation is scheduled for the year
2000, i.e. when the next Commission will come into office. 
This reorganisation will also include a corresponding restructuration of the Commission's
sub-divisions(39). The sole explicit target set by the IGC in this respect is that there should be
a vice-president responsible for all external affairs matters (so far, foreign policy and external
commercial relations are split up between six(40) Commissioners)(41).
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Apart from its probably undisputed effects with respect to the institution's efficiency and the
coherence of its policies, both strengthening the Commission President by giving him/her
organisational prerogatives and reorganising the Commission's structure with a view to possibly
centralising specific policy areas in the hands of a few higher-order Commissioners (vice-presidents)
might lead to a more personified perception of the Commission. Just as the heads and senior
ministers of national governments are paid more attention to than other members of a government,
this might, in the medium term, result in more public awareness for some Commissioners and thus
the whole Commission as a central political actor of the Union. In this context, it is noteworthy that
the Commission gained the right of initiative in the 3rd pillar and in the new title on the free
movement of persons – areas which are of particular interest to the citizenry at large.
B. The Nomination of the Commission: Towards Party Politics?
The Maastricht Treaty reform gave the EP the right to be consulted when the Commission President
is designated by the member state governments, and the right to give its assent to the investiture of
the whole collegiate. According to the Amsterdam Treaty, assent of the EP will be needed for the
designation of the Commission President(42), in addition to the approval of the new team of
Commissioners. Furthermore, the nominee for President will be given a greater say in the choice of
the members of the College. While so far, the nominee was only 'consulted' by the appointing
Member states, the Amsterdam Treaty gives him/her a right to assent(43). This acknowledges the
enhanced status of the President-to-be who, at that point, has already passed a vote of confidence in
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Considering on the one hand this new investiture procedure and, on the other, the enhanced role of
the President vis-à-vis his/her fellows in the college, we conclude that the character of the
'appointing-the-Commission game' might change in the medium run. Most likely, the candidate will
be invited to a hearing at the EP before the formal designation. His/her political programme will in
the future be under parliamentary scrutiny. Due to this shift from secret diplomatic negotiations to a
more open and public procedure the terms of the debate on European policy-making might be
reshaped along party political lines. This might, in turn, prompt the design and public marketing of
alternative ideological designs of the European agenda.
Recently, Simon Hix(44) rightly pointed out that such a shift towards a truly parliamentary model of
the investiture procedure rests on two premises: (1) that in EP elections, voters are able to choose
between rival platforms for European level action; and (2) that the investiture of the President will be
determined by a majority in the EP which reflects an electoral majority. Based on data from the 1994
European elections and the 1995 investiture procedure, Hix shows that „the elections were still
fought by national parties on the performance of national executives", and that „the winning coalition
was not a majority from the European elections but an 'artificial' majority of national governments
and (minority) partisan allies of their nominee". He acknowledges, however, that (only) further
institutional reform may rectify this situation, and goes on to make proposals in this direction(45). In
our perspective, this view might underestimate the dynamics of European level politics because of
the gradual increase of powers of the EP. In this respect, as was outlined in other chapters of this
paper, the new Treaty contributes a lot. The politicisation along party lines might therefore be less a
matter of a uniform electoral procedure, as he suggests, nor a question of breaking the link of the
European and the national party systems, but rather one of a gradual shift of focus from the national
to the European level. We would argue that the point might be less that the European parties have to
emancipate from national politics but rather that the national parties will 'go Europe' because of the
growing importance of this level in politics. Although his proposal to let the Parliament choose the
candidate for the President first and to submit this choice only afterwards to the Council for approval
would accelerate this dynamic, we are convinced that the system set in place by the Amsterdam
Treaty will give a forceful impetus with a view to politicising and Europeanising the selection of the
European executive.
The envisaged changes of the Commission's internal structure together with this new political
relationship between the Commission and the EP will at least bring the Commission closer than it
ever was before to our traditional image of a 'government' which cooperates with a parliamentary
majority.
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V. The EP and Future Enlargement: Towards
Representativeness
The EP can hardly be called the 'anchor of democracy in the EU' without resting on solid democratic
representation. Fact is that European elections cannot be considered 'equal' because the weight of the
votes differs considerably among member states: while one German MEP represents more than
800.000 citizens, one Belgian MEP represents only some 400.000, and one of the six Luxembourg
MEPs just 66.000 citizens.
In an institutional perspective, the EP's main goal has always been and still is to become one of two
7 of 28 26.10.97 19:05
EIoP: Text 1997-015: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-015.htm'legislative chambers' in the EU. Within this model, the EP wanted to be the representative of the
peoples of Europe whereas the Council should represent the states. In its report with a view to the
IGC in May 1995, the EP made this perfectly clear when discussing the issue of reweighting the
votes in the Council: "... it is in the Parliament that population is represented. Council represents
States"(46).
Therefore, proportionality should not be aimed at in the Council but strengthened in the EP. As for
the Council, the model 'one minister – one vote', similar to the US Senate, was proposed. This
US-style approach, however, does not fit into the picture the European top politicians have of their
'sui-generis-federal-type' polity. The Protocol on the institutions with a view to future enlargement,
annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, affirms once again that the system of weighted votes in the
Council will not be abandoned (but rather strengthened) in the near future.
As for the EP, the Amsterdam Treaty points at the issue of proportionality: Article 137 [= 189 new]
TEC will be amended by a new second paragraph fixing the maximum number of 700 MEPs. Article
138 [= 190 new] para. 2 new TEC(47) which includes the table of the number of MEPs per member
state will be complemented by a new subparagraph:
„In the event of amendments to this paragraph, the number of representatives elected in each Member
State must ensure appropriate representation of the peoples of the States brought together in the
Community." (emphasis added)
Although it does not seem that the distribution of seats in the EP will be an issue before the next
enlargement, the setting of a ceiling combined with the need to secure appropriate representation sets
a tricky agenda for the enlargement IGC: applying the present system, Poland's MEPs alone
(representing some 38m citizens) would occupy almost all of the remaining available offices in
Strasbourg and Brussels. Since it is most likely that at least three countries will be part of the 'first
wave', already the negotiations starting „as soon as possible after December 1997"(48) will have to
tackle the issue.
How can 'appropriate representation' be interpreted? Two principles might be applied in order to
achieve this goal. (1) First of all, the vote of each European should be of approximately equal weight.
Because of the enormous differences in size of the member states, this maxim cannot be applied
systematically under the condition that only 700 seats are available: the proportion between the
populations of Luxembourg and Germany is approx. 1:205; since there are also other large Member
states, the number of 205 MEPs for Germany is out of question (because the maximum of 700 MEPs
would be exceeded); consequently, the number for Germany has to be lower than 205 and
Luxembourg would not get a single MEP (and there are several other similarly small states among
the applicants, in particular Cyprus); the larger the Union gets, the more states would share the
'Luxembourg destiny' of not getting a single representative in the EP.
(2) The building of new trans-national electoral districts for the purpose of European elections being
out of question for the foreseeable future, the only alternative solution is a minimum threshold rule:
in order to ensure representation of all (still separated and partly quite small) peoples of the Union, at
least one MEP would have to be attributed to each state. This rule, however, does not seem to ensure
appropriate representation. A single MEP cannot represent the whole political spectrum of her or his
country of origin. Therefore, at least three seats per country seem appropriate in order ensure
representation of the centre, the right, and the left political movements of a country.
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distribution as presented in Table 2 would follow. We applied two different systems of calculations
with different outcomes. Not surprisingly, the results in both cases show that only the five major
member states would gain from these changes, whereas all other countries would lose seats, ranging
from 3 to 7 in the first variant, and from 3 to 9 in the second. Most striking is Germany's enormous
gain in seats (32 or 38). When applying these new rules to a further increased number of member
states, not only one single country but a growing proportion would fall within the group of countries
with three MEPs only.
Table 2
To conclude: the direction of the indicated but not yet implemented reform corresponds to the EP's
preferred option. However, the Protocol 'on the institutions with a view to further enlargement'
annexed to the new Treaty indicates that no corresponding reform in the Council will take place in
the foreseeable future: the system of weighted votes is – in political reality – still beyond any doubt
and will probably even be further adapted towards more proportionality. In our view, strengthening
proportionality in the EP as foreseen by the Amsterdam Treaty is a favourable option in terms of
European democracy. However, one has to acknowledge that the practical winners will only be the
largest countries and in particular Germany. Reweighting the votes in the Council in the direction
which was indicated by the Treaty of Amsterdam would again be in the interest of the large countries
only. Even when taking into account the 'special case theorem' (the EU as a sui generis system), it
might therefore be difficult to put the indicated reforms into practise, i.e. to modify the traditional
federal principle of representing the populations in one and the states in the other chamber in a way
that unilaterally strengthens the big. At least as a statement on empirics, Joseph Weiler(49) is
certainly right: as long as there is no redefined integrated European polity the social legitimacy of the
European system remains precarious and, thus, it seems difficult to convince the members of the still
separated polities of Europe to give up power (here: seats in the European Parliament) even if for the
sake of the overall principle of representativeness.
VI. National Parliaments: No Co-Decision-Powers
For some, giving the national parliaments a greater if not decisive say in European politics was not
only an additional means to improve the status of democracy in the IGC, but even the better
alternative route for democratic reform as compared with the strengthening of the EP. In particular,
some proposed a European Senate, i.e. a third chamber consisting of representatives of the national
parliaments(50). The debates with a view to the IGC focused on the relationship between (and
possible hierarchy of) the then two parliamentary chambers at the EU level, and the possible negative
effects on the efficiency of the decision-making structure of adding yet another institution to it.
Already in the so-called Dublin-II-paper, a summary of the negotiations at the IGC's half-term(51), a
rather minimal reform along the traditional paths was suggested.
The Amsterdam Treaty will include a Protocol 'on the role of national parliaments in the European
Union' which states in its preamble that the Conference desires to encourage greater involvement of
national parliaments in the activities of the EU. However, 'greater involvement' is a relative term and
does not, as the Protocol shows, refer to formal participation, but only an exchange of views. In sharp
contrast to proposals to give the national parliaments explicit and formal priority over their
governments in the Council, the preamble explicitly 'recalls' „that scrutiny by individual national
parliaments of their own government in relation to the activities of the Union is a matter for the
particular constitutional organisation and practice of each Member state". In sum, the European
'constitutional' law implicitly rejects direct and formal involvement of the national parliaments in the
EU polity and explicitly denies to regulate the relationship between the national parliaments and the
members of the Council of Ministers.
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The Protocol has two parts. The first aims at improving the transfer of information, in particular of
all Commission consultation documents and proposals for legislation, from the European to the
national level. This is of great importance for the (at least theoretical) ability of the national
parliaments to scrutinise the activities of their governments at the European level. The Protocol
distinguishes between two types of documents: while green and white papers and communications
shall be directly sent to the national parliaments, the legislative proposals continue to be forwarded to
the national legislature via the national governments. This again underlines the indirect character of
the involvement of the national parliaments in EU decision-making. However, the Protocol aims at
ensuring timely information by, first, providing that the Commission proposals „shall be made
available in good time so that the ... national parliament receives them as appropriate". In addition,
the Protocol stipulates that a period of six weeks shall elapse between a proposal being made
available in all languages to the EP and the Council by the Commission and the date when it is first
placed on a Council agenda for decision. This aims at ensuring that the national parliaments after
having received the proposal in due time have at least a couple of weeks to form their opinion and to
possibly influence their ministers' voting behaviour in the Council. There is, however, an exception
to this rule: in cases of urgency, the reasons for which shall be stated in the Council's decision, the
latter may decide before the end of the six week period.
The second part of the above mentioned Protocol deals with the future role of COSAC, the
Conference of European Affairs Committees(52). COSAC is recognised as a body with the right to
make any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the EU institutions, either on its own
initiative or when a specific legislative proposal was forwarded to it. In particular, the Protocol
envisages commentating activity of COSAC with respect to (1) proposals and initiatives in relation to
the establishment of the so-called 'area of freedom, security and justice'(53) which might have a
direct bearing on the rights and freedoms of individuals; (2) the application of the principle of
subsidiarity; and (3) questions regarding fundamental rights. The contributions made by COSAC will
be forwarded to the institutions but shall neither bind the latter nor prejudge the position of the
national parliaments.
For practical reasons, these provisions will not change the relationship between the national
parliaments and the Union a great deal. Although receiving relevant information well in advance of
actual decisions is a necessary condition, it is nevertheless not sufficient to allow monitoring and
influencing of EU politics by national actors. The struggle with a huge amount of documents which
the national parliaments receive already under the present less formalised system(54) establishes that
it is very doubtful whether national parliaments will ever be able to fulfil two 'full time jobs' at a
time: controlling both national legislation and implementation of EU legislation as well as watching
over the European activities. This is the main reason why many observers see the European
Parliament much better in place to supply parliamentary legitimacy in the European decision-making
process. The drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty unequivocally declared their preference for the
'European' solution by reinforcing the role of the EP instead of including the national parliaments to a
larger extent then hitherto. Thus, there will be no co-decision role for the national legislatives at the
EC level.
VII. The Regional Committee: No Europe of the Regions
The Committee of the Regions (CoR) was only just set up by the last Treaty reform. Nevertheless,
relevant proposals put forward with a view to the IGC 1996/97 were partly far-reaching: it was even
proposed to transform the CoR into a third legislative chamber with veto powers, in particular with
regard to the principle of subsidiarity(55). The new Treaty, however, will only moderately reinforce
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The organisational structure of the CoR: the secretariat (and budget) was so far annexed to the
Economic and Social Committee (ECS). Now its structure will be separated from the ECS(56);
The CoR will have the power to adopt its own rules of procedure without approval of the
Council(57); 
The CoR may be consulted by the Council, the Commission, and also the EP if those
institutions consider it appropriate(58); 
Consultation will be compulsory in a couple of additional cases such as in environmental and
transport policies (see Table 1); 
Although it had been discussed to restrict the membership of the CoR to persons elected at the
local or regional level, the Treaty of Amsterdam includes no solution to the problem of lacking
direct democratic legitimacy of a number of members of the CoR. Worth mentioning in this
context is only the new incompatibility rule regarding both membership in the EP and the
CoR(59).
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Summarising the new provisions regarding the CoR in the notion of 'consolidation', we come to the
conclusion that7 the Treaty of Amsterdam will not bring about a 'Europe of the regions'. It is not even
a small step in that direction. Although its position will certainly be reinforced in some respects, the
CoR remains a purely consultative body and the issues of representativeness and legitimacy of its
members are still unsettled. It is obvious that the formal decision-making structure gives the CoR
only a very weak voice. The EU remains centred around the state level, either via the delegation of
national ministers to the Council, or via elections to the European Parliament held – although at the
same time – within the boundaries of the 15 Member states, and not in transnational (regional)
electoral districts.
As we have already argued elsewhere(60), this has good reasons: Considering that the quasi-federal
structure of the Union is already a very complicated and delicate construction, and that
decision-making by a two-chamber system with unanimity requirements is already a lengthy process
susceptible to deadlocks, a third chamber would not seem advisable. Looking at the considerable
differences in size, organisation and competences of the various 'regions' represented in the CoR, the
idea of a third chamber to enhance the power of the regions of centralised states might even be
considered at odds with the principle of subsidiarity.
VIII. Decision-Making in the Council: Towards More Efficient
Policy-Making
The Amsterdam Treaty tackles the issue of more efficient policy-making by the extension of the
scope of qualified majority voting (A.) which also includes a peculiarity, i.e. a provision reminding
of the famous 'Luxembourg Compromise' (B.).
A. More Qualified Majority Voting
(1) Unanimity is often considered as the stumbling block for further integration. Therefore, the IGC
aimed at extending the scope of qualified majority voting under the label of 'enhancing the efficiency
of the decision-making process'. Although by no means all items of various 'letters to Santa Claus'
circulated in advance of the IGC were finally agreed on, we may conclude that some steps forward
were made at Amsterdam (see Table 1): among others, the implementing decisions in the 2nd (CSFP)
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and on some social policy issues(62) were moved to majority voting.
By contrast, unanimity was again chosen for a series of new competences: the implementation of the
Schengen acquis(63); the determination of a breach of the Union's principles(64); measures against
racial etc. discrimination(65); the extension of the competence in the common commercial policy
(CCP) to services and intellectual property(66); the regulation of the conditions governing the
performance of duties of the MEPs(67); the suspension of international agreements and the
establishment of a Union's international position(68). Because most of these new cases may be
categorised as quasi-constitutional matters unanimity may be considered appropriate because in
conformity with the present system. Exceptions without an obvious reason are, however, the
measures against racial discrimination and the provision regarding international agreements as well
as some existing competences such as industrial policy. Others among the unanimous decisions,
although not constitutional in character obviously touch the very core of national sovereignty
(cultural policy and basic or framework decisions in foreign policy and in justice and police affairs).
(2) The transfer from unanimous to majority voting has to be analysed not only in terms of enhanced
efficiency of decision-making but also in terms of democracy. The argument that unanimity gives
veto power to a minister in the Council and thus establishes a link of democratic control via the
national parliaments is spurious(69). If qualified majority voting is not accompanied by codecision
rights for the EP, however, this leads to a structural gap of parliamentary control.
The Amsterdam Treaty still provides for cases where the Council acts under the qualified majority
rule without the EP being involved and having a democratically legitimised veto power (e.g. with
respect to employment policy guidelines and recommendations(70); to the implementation of social
partner agreements(71); and to the setting-up of joint undertakings in R&T development(72)). By
contrast, Article G/73o [= 67 new] of the new Title on the free movement of persons allows for a
transfer from unanimity to majority voting in the Council only when the EP is involved via Article
189b [= 251 new] TEC.
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(3) Another point to raise in this respect is the persisting irregularity that the codecision procedure is
combined with a unanimity requirement in the Council(73). This makes some stages of the
codecision procedure (in particular the conciliation procedure) almost useless because it restricts the
Council's room for manoeuvre (and thus its capacity to reach a compromise with the EP) drastically.
To sum up: by transferring some areas from the unanimity rule to qualified majority voting, the
Amsterdam Treaty provides for selective improvements in this area only. It does not solve highly
salient issues such as the weak involvement of the EP in some areas where the Council decides with
majority, and the combination of codecision with unanimity in the Council. Whether these changes
will bring about a significantly improved decision-making efficiency in the Council remains to be
seen.
B. The 'Amsterdam Compromise'
In order to facilitate the shift to majority voting, various models were put forward – in particular the
idea of a super-qualified majority(74). The Amsterdam Treaty is successful in shifting at least some
areas right away to qualified majority voting(75). In one case, i.e. for basic decisions in CFSP(76),
unanimity is still kept as a general rule, but a new and highly sophisticated rule applies: in case a
member state is against the decision which is about to be taken, it may abstain from the vote and thus
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however, not bound by the decision, and does not have to participate in its financing (so-called
'constructive abstention'). Thus the unanimity requirement is still applicable but decisions can be
taken without the explicit assent of all members of the Council. Only up to one third of the member
states may however abstain in this qualified manner. If more than five states do not wish to
participate, the otherwise unanimous vote cannot be taken.
In two other cases, the new Treaty replaces unanimity by the 'extra-qualified' majority already known
from those cases where the Council hitherto acts without a proposal from the Commission (at least
ten member states have to be in favour of a measure). This system will apply to a series of decisions
taken under the 3rd pillar regarding Justice and Police Cooperation (JPC)(77).
But the negotiators of the Amsterdam Treaty were even more creative. In three cases [authorisation
to closer cooperation (flexibility) in the areas covered by the TEC(78) and in the 3rd pillar (JPC)(79);
implementing measures in CFSP(80)] the new Treaty provides for a formula which reminds of the
old 'Luxembourg Compromise'(81): 
„If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it
intends to oppose the granting of an authorisation by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken.
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European
Council for decision by unanimity."
Following the blueprint from the 1960ies, a special kind of veto is therefore established. Any
blockade must however be qualified. Only important reasons of national policy may be invoked by a
member state.(82) As opposed to the 'Luxembourg Compromise', the 'Amsterdam Compromise'
requires that the reasons are stated openly. It is not sufficient to refer simply to important national
interests in general to prevent the decision to be taken by a qualified majority. While the
'Luxembourg Compromise' was not quite precise as to the consequences of such a declaration, the
new formula may lead to the matter being referred to the highest Union level. This is quite
remarkable because it seems to be the very first time that the European Council acts as a formal
'appellate body' for the Council. Since its decisions are always taken by unanimity, the opposing state
gets back its veto which was, in principle, just given up during the IGC, at least on a case to case
basis.
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The formal introduction of the basic idea of the Luxembourg compromise into the Treaties might
have consequences for the legal value of the old 'Luxembourg Compromise'(83). Although the
wording is not exactly the same the ideas behind the two versions are, with the Amsterdam version
being more precise though. Therefore, one may argue that, as the formula is now written into the
primary law of the Union for three cases only, the 'Luxembourg Accords' are finally 'dead': invoking
national policy grounds in order to prevent a decision to be taken by qualified majority is – legally
and politically – not possible any longer, except in the three cases explicitly mentioned.
To conclude: the 'Amsterdam Compromise' model and the extension of the extra-qualified majority
system may indeed facilitate the decision process. However, the Amsterdam Treaty did not extend
these models to the majority of those cases where unanimity was required. Therefore, it does not
seem to us that the Treaty reform reached the goal to make the Council a more efficient
decision-making body: stalemates will characterise its negotiations also in the future. Nevertheless, a
path is found which might be continued in the next IGC.
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EU Politics
Transparency and openness of the EU were, at least formally, high on the IGC agenda. The issue is
twofold: first, it relates to the openness of the decision-making processes (A.); second, it refers to the
accessibility of the Treaty framework and of the texts of the Union legislation (B.). Especially the
first aspect, i.e. increased transparency, can affect the institutional balance because the more
information is available the more actors like the EP and the Commission can selectively put public
pressure on the Council or on single delegations.
A. Less Secrecy in the Council of Ministers
One of the main arguments in the debate on the democratic deficit of the Union has for a long time
been the fact that the European legislature acts in secrecy: Until very recently, no Council meetings
were open to the public, and neither were the specific results of Council deliberations. The situation
changed slightly after the debate on transparency was boosted in the aftermath of the ratification
problems with the Maastricht Treaty. However, due to the reluctance of most governments, reforms
have not, so far, fundamentally changed the state of affairs. According to the Council's 1993 Rules of
Procedure(84), the meetings of the Council remained non-public in general; however, after a specific
decision by unanimous vote, it is possible that individual meetings be broadcast. Furthermore, the
Council started to systematically publish the voting results when it acted as a legislator(85). Since a
request by the British newspaper Financial Times to be informed of the existing number of qualified
majority votes created considerable turmoil during summer 1994, the Secretariat of the Council also
keeps a register of votes on legislation(86). But still, the Council is an institution which prefers to
keep politics behind closed doors. This is prominently shown by the fact that according to its rules of
procedure(87) the consultations of the Council are subject to secrecy. Thus, there is no access to the
minutes of the meetings of the major legislative actor at the European level. The Decision of 20
December 1993 concerning public access to Council documents(88) gave rise to differing
interpretations, with Denmark and the Netherlands arguing that there should at least be an
appreciation of the secrecy of a requested Council document on a case-to-case basis. The other
governments, however, opted for the version that as soon as the communication of minutes is
requested, refusal is automatic(89). 
Against this background, it was widely expected that the IGC would come up with a more
far-reaching solution to this central issue with respect to the state of democracy at the EU level.(90)
The main significance of the respective texts agreed at Amsterdam is that the rules previously
contained in mere interinstitutional agreements and rules of procedure are now part of the primary
law of the Union. Thus, their implementation will in the future be checked by the ECJ on the basis of
the following standards:
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The very first Article of the European Union Treaty will be amended to acknowledge that
decisions in 'the ever closer Union' are taken 'as openly as possible'(91); 
A general(92) 'right to access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents' is
established(93); 
This right to access is, however, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined by
codecision of the Council and the EP within two years of the coming into force of the new
Treaty(94); based on this basic decision, the three institutions shall elaborate in their own rules
of procedure specific provisions regarding access to their documents(95); 
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its room of manoeuvre when adapting its rules of procedure(96): (1) the Council will have to
define the cases in which it is to be regarded as acting in its legislative capacity(97); (2) in
these cases the Council is obliged to allow „greater access to documents ... while at the same
time preserving the effectiveness of its decision-making process"; since the right balance of the
two interests (greater access vs. effectiveness) seems difficult to find, the Amsterdam Treaty
provides (3) that, when acting as a legislator, the following three categories of documents shall
be made public 'in any event', i.e. regardless of the publication's possible negative effect on the
effectiveness of the Council's procedures: 
the results of the votes; 
explanations of votes; 
the statements in the minutes.
Although the framework decision on the general principles and conditions of the right to access to
document will only be taken by the EP and the Council after the Amsterdam Treaty comes into force,
we may draw some preliminary conclusions:
(1) A detailed comparison between the new conditions and the present situation reveals that the
Council will have to adapt its rules of procedure:
the explanations of votes will have to be published eo ipso, i.e. without the request of the
respective Member state, as is the case now(98); 
the possibility to deny access to the results of the votes by a respective decision has to be
drooped since all results of the votes taken by the Council in its capacity as legislator have to
be released(99); 
it is doubtful whether the present definition of 'legislative action' is compatible with the new
rules; in particular, the exception with regard to 'discussions leading to indicative votes or to
the adoption of preparatory acts' seems incompatible: first, it would prevent the publication of
many results since there are often indicative or 'test' votes, but only seldom formal votes [see
below point (2)]; second, the term of 'preparatory acts' also encompasses e.g. common
positions adopted during the codecision procedure; these acts are of particular interest and
maybe, e.g. in those cases where the EP agrees in the 2nd reading with the position adopted by
the Council in the 1st reading, the only formal decision taken by the Council during the whole
procedure.
(2) As already mentioned, detailed results of the votes in the Council rarely exist because most
decisions are not taken by a formal vote; rather, the Presidency states informally that „the necessary
majority is given"(100). Therefore, the publication of voting results in itself will not allow to trace
the actual voting behaviour of the members of the Council in each and every case. This represents
however an important precondition for the national parliaments' capacity to hold their ministers
accountable for their behaviour at the European level. In short, an important step with a view to
improving the indirect democratic legitimacy of the Council as a legislative chamber of the EC is still
not taken.
(3) As regards the publication of the statements in the minutes, it seems doubtful whether this will
actually lead to more transparency (or rather to the contrary). The ECJ only recently established that
these statements are insignificant in legal terms since they are currently not being published(101).
When published in the future, one cannot exclude that they might gain interpretative value for the
legislative act in case. If so, it seems likely that there will be even more statements of this kind: those
Member states not in accord with the interpretative statement of another state will feel obliged to post
a counter statement in order to be able to refer to it in case of a later dispute. Therefore, the
unfortunate practise that problems of interpretation already known at the time of adoption of an act
are shifted to the sphere of statements in the minutes rather than solved might even gain in weight. In
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intransparent then before: s/he would certainly wish to rely on the text of the proper legislative act,
unaware of the fact that there is a second layer with a set of further or even different rules. In this
scenario, the EP's role seems crucial in insisting on precise legal texts. All in all, it seems necessary
to reconsider the status of the statements in the minutes in principle and the problematic
consequences of their publication in particular.
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(4) It is noteworthy that there is no provision obliging the Council to keep and to publish the whole
of the minutes (proces verbal) as known from the national legislative chambers.
To sum up: The new provisions on transparency and openness have some merits, especially the fact
that the rules enjoy a higher legal value than previously and that the Council will not have the
possibility to prevent the publication of certain types of documents when acting in its legislative
capacity. However, the Amsterdam Treaty also raises some tricky questions about the practise of
decision-making in the Council (the rarity of formal votes; and the legal status of statements in the
minutes).
B. The Related Issue of the Accessibility of the Treaty framework
From a realistic viewpoint, one could not expect this IGC to draft a well structured 'constitutional
document' which could serve as a point of reference and identification for the citizens of the
European Union(102). However, a major effort to simplify the Treaty structure was explicitly on the
agenda. This issue has to be considered one of the great failures of the IGC:
(1) The pillar structure will be kept and even diversified since one may argue that the partial
'communautarization' of the 3rd pillar creates a pillar '1a', at least for the first five years.
(2) The provisions for the inclusion of the Schengen Agreement with their numerous exceptions and
counter-exceptions as well as those providing for closer cooperation among a subgroup of Member
states (differentiated integration) add further complexity to the Treaty framework.
(3) The agreed renumbering of all Articles regardless the fact that no consolidation of the Treaties
will take place only superficially serves the interest of more transparency. Most probably, the new
Article numbers will only be valid for a short period of time since the next Treaty revisions are
already scheduled: before enlargement, at the latest when the number of Member states exceeds 20,
the whole institutional and procedural framework will be subject of new revisions; the destiny of the
ECSC Treaty will have to be tackled before the year 1999; the inclusion of the Euratom Treaty seems
to be only a matter of time, too. While even experts will have a hard time adapting to the
renumbering, the uninitiated will not profit from this superficial change: the mixing of procedural
and material provisions will persist. Thus, there is still no easily accessible Treaty structure on the
horizon.
(4) Finally, the Amsterdam Treaty even beats its predecessor when it comes to the number of
protocols and declarations annexed.
X. An Overall Assessment
Our conclusion will proceed in three steps: first, we shall measure the outcome of the IGC 1996/97
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view on the Treaty of Amsterdam considering the new institutional balance (B.); to conclude, we
raise the question whether the state of democracy in the Union shall be improved by this new
institutional balance (C.).
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A. Was the Official Mandate Fulfilled?
A couple of official tasks was attributed to the IGC either by the Maastricht Treaty or the (European)
Council(103). Our analysis shall proceed along this list as far as the institutional and procedural
aspects are concerned:
„...considering ... to what extent the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this
Treaty may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the
mechanisms and the institutions of the Community." (Article B [= 2 new] 5th indent
TEU)
In this regard, the IGC did precisely what it had been asked for. With respect to some of the (in 1991)
new policies, the Amsterdam Treaty brings about procedural innovations (public health, vocational
training, environmental policy, transeuropean networks; cf. Table 1). No changes will take place in
training of the youth, cultural, consumer and cohesion policies. With regard to the co-operation in the
field of justice and home affairs, the Conference came to the conclusion that only a few of the areas
are suitable for the standard procedures of the 1st pillar (asylum, visa, immigration); accordingly only
those areas were 'communautarized'; for others, the new Treaty allows a transfer into the 1st pillar by
a Council decision at a later time.
„The scope of the procedure under this Article may be widened, ..., on the basis of a
report to be submitted to the Council by the Commission by 1996 at the latest." (Article
189b [= 251 new] para. 8 TEC)
The scope of the codecision procedure was significantly widened, not least by the near abolishment
of the co-operation procedure. The procedure was furthermore simplified and, on the basis of the
experience since its coming into operation, improved. In this respect, too, the Conference carried out
its mandate.
„improvement of the budgetary procedure" (Interinstitutional Agreement 29/10/1993)
The budgetary procedure is not mentioned in a single line of the new Treaty.
„In adopting the institutional provisions of the Accession Treaty, the Member States and
the applicant countries agree that,... the Intergovernmental Conference to be convened in
1996 will consider the questions relating to the number of members of the
Commission..." (European Council, Brussels 10-11/12/1993)
Although indeed relevant in the wider context of efficiency as well, the issue of the size of the
Commission was postponed.
„...and the weighting of the votes of the Member States in the Council." (European
Council, Brussels 10-11/12/1993)
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likelihood of a fast enlargement. Considering the open divergences between the smaller and the
larger states, it was a pragmatic choice to postpone a solution which will probably not be crucial
within the next six years.
„... any measures deemed necessary to facilitate the work of the institutions and
guarantee their effective operation." (European Council, Brussels 10-11/12/1993)
Without doubt, some progress has been made in this area: the upgrading of the directly elected
European Parliament through the reform and extension of the codecision procedure; the legal
upgrading of the transparency rules in the Treaty; and the new organisational structure for CFSP(104)
are the main achievements of this IGC. On the other side of the coin the reform of the Commission
was postponed; the variety of decision-making procedures is still confusing; and last but not least,
there is only limited transfer from unanimity to majority voting.
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„... any other measure deemed necessary to facilitate the work of the institutions and
guarantee their effective operation in the perspective of enlargement" (European
Council, Corfu 24-25/6/1995)
It is obvious that the Conference did not succeed in putting in place the necessary institutional
changes that would allow the adhesion negotiations to concentrate on the policy issues. Neither
distribution of the seats in the EP, nor the future size of the Commission, nor the future weighting of
votes in the Council was tackled in a precise manner. Although the Protocol on the institutions with
the prospect of enlargement of the EU indicates possible solutions, these remain rather vague and
open for new deliberation. In other words, the preparation for enlargement was postponed.
Looking at the Amsterdam results from this 'official' perspective, we are bound to draw the
conclusion that the IGC was both successful and a failure; it was successful by agreeing on at least
some important reforms, but a failure with respect to the preparation of the next enlargement. Let us
now turn to an account of the institutional reforms in a wider and more political perspective.
B. A New Institutional Balance Is in Sight
One may easily overlook the true significance of the new institutional arrangements because they
seem hardly spectacular if looked at separately. Viewed from some distance, the Amsterdam Treaty
brought to an end what the Single European Act began and the Maastricht Treaty continued: making
the European Parliament a co-legislator, equally powerful than the Council. So far, codecision was
biased in favour of the Council and it was the exception rather than the rule in EC policy-making. In
both regards, the Amsterdam Treaty marks a seachange. To be sure, there are still instances where
the Community legislates without the EP being involved on an equal footing with the Council. These
cases will however be the exception and codecision the rule. The EP involvement in the investiture
of the Commission, too, were reformed. The genuine political role of the Commission (notably its
President) will in the future be acknowledged, at least at the time of its investiture, when the
envisaged activities of an incoming Commission will be the matter of parliamentary and thus public
debate.
In our view, the incremental change of the EC institutional balance during the two decades from
1979 (the first direct European elections) to 1999 (the likely date of the entry into force of the
Amsterdam Treaty) in sum made up for a fundamental reform which is now in principle completed.
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such as e.g. the extension of codecision to the legislative areas that are not yet covered seem
necessary and likely further steps. The new underlying institutional balance as established by the
Amsterdam Treaty will nevertheless basically remain the same: a much more politicised Commission
drawing legitimacy from the way it came into office; a European Parliament that is able to play a
decisive role in the day-to-day legislative business; and a Council of Ministers that is not in a
position any longer to impose its views on the other institutions.
This new balance, and in particular the role of the EP, seems to represent the 'largest' common
denominator among the Member states: at least in the medium term, there are no signs that this
compromise will lead to a fundamentally different relationship between the main institutions. This
statement may be substantiated by the following considerations:
(1) It seems very unlikely that the EP will ever acquire predominance over the Council; keeping in
mind that all further Treaty changes will have to be negotiated by the governments sitting in the
Council, the now equal position of both institutions (under codecision) is certainly the limit.
(2) Parliament itself dropped its demand to get a genuine right of initiative which would have broken
the relevant monopoly of the Commission. Evidently, a right of initiative would alter the institutional
balance considerably since the Commission would be almost 'out of the game' whenever the EP takes
the initiative. However, in order to actually make it more than a formal right, Parliament would have
to change its working structure fundamentally with a view to elaborating detailed draft law. As far as
we can see, there is no such political will, not even on the side of the MEPs. The present division of
labour between an agenda setting Commission and two decision-making bodies seems widely
accepted and will therefore hardly be changed in the near future.
(3) The envisaged reforms of the Commission's internal structure will not affect its external role as a
supranational body. In particular, the issue of adjusting the size of the Commission to the challenges
of future enlargements may only further its supranational character, especially if at any point the
number of Commissioners is lower than the number of Member states, or if an hierarchy of
Commissioners should be introduced.
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(4) The external position of the Commission, too, is not going to change in the foreseeable future.
Since the independence of this supranational body seems to be a very successful characteristic of the
Union's political system, it is hard to imagine why and how this should be changed. The demand of
the EP for a motion of no confidence against single Commissioners was, by the way, not included
any longer in its latest resolutions. It seems also improbable that the internal restructuring of the
Commission along the lines of the Amsterdam Treaty might eventually lead to the President's right to
dismiss his/her colleagues. This might fill the gap of political control over single Commissioners
between the investiture and the end of term of the Commission. Even without a right to censure
individual Commissioners, the EP might then put political pressure on the Commission President and
the latter would be able to react accordingly. We do not expect, however, this change to be put into
practice in the near future. It should be mentioned that at least, the Amsterdam Treaty improves the
President's position with regard to the allocation of portfolios. S/he might in the future take away
responsibilities from a Commissioner who does not perform adequately.
(5) Still on the agenda is the problem of how to reweight the votes in the Council. Whatever the
outcome of the coming negotiations, it may neither fundamentally change the Council's position
within the institutional triangle nor will it alter the character of that institution to such an extent that
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Council either a fully representative or an US-Senate-like body with equal weight for all states.
Neither of these extreme variants will be set in place since the first is strictly opposed by the smaller
and the second by the larger Member states. Therefore, only minor changes in the middle ground
without fundamental consequences for the status and function of the Council are to be expected.
(6) A much stronger role for the European Parliament in the budgetary procedure would indeed affect
the present institutional balance. A consensus to change this seems, however, unlikely to emerge.
This IGC was again instructed to discuss the issue but did not come up with a reform. Keeping in
mind that the next enlargements deeply affect the Union's financial order, we venture the prediction
that a shift of power with respect to the budget will not take place at least before the next
enlargements are financially 'digested'.
(1) To sum up, the arguments presented above strongly underpin our case that the new Treaty
outlines an interinstitutional balance which will be refined rather than fundamentally challenged in
the foreseeable future.
C. Outlook: Towards Democracy?
As has been pointed out by numerous writers, we should not try to directly compare the institutional
setting at the EU level with the traditional image of policy-making structures in the national context.
If we would, it became obvious that the weak role of the EP in the budgetary procedure and the near
absent role in constitutional matters makes it quite different from its national counterparts. When
associating the Commission with the national executive function, the EP's control is not comparable
to the national systems of parliamentary scrutiny over government. Obviously, this approach misses
the point: the EU is a 'sui generis' polity. It is less common but important to note that nevertheless
(or: even more so), the EU has to be measured against standards of democratic governance which are
independent from the actual institutional setup. In fact, representative as well as direct democratic
models in their various forms, all aim at assuring that government is both responsive and responsible.
Without going into details here, a responsive government features efficient instruments that link
citizens' needs and priorities to policy outcomes; and a responsible government can be controled and
recalled by the electorate.
Therefore, we should look at the new institutional balance emerging from the Amsterdam Treaty in a
perspective that measures it against these basic democratic principles instead of comparing it to the
traditional national models. In this respect, our assessment will be hybrid: on the one hand, it seems
obvious that the balance was altered in favour of the EP which is the directly legitimated body of the
Union; the Commission's new investiture procedure is finally drawn out of the mists of secret
intergovernmental bargain into the light of public hearings; the principle of openness and
transparency has at least been introduced in primary law. This leads to the conclusion that the EU
will be somewhat more democratic after the Treaty of Amsterdam comes into force.
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On the other hand, the de facto modes of governance are quite different at the end of the 20th century
from the time when the principles of representative democracy were first implemented. At the EU
level, too, a series of agencies fulfil tasks that previously were under direct control of the democratic
institutions (notably ESCB). Much of the implementation of EU policies is done without any control
by the EP, as the issue of comitology remained again untouched in the 1996-97 IGC. Furthermore,
most of the political decisions tend nowadays to be taken 'in the shade' of the representative
institutions only. The Union nevertheless represents an extreme case with 85% of all decisions de
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subject of democratic accountability is an open question at all layers of the European multi-level
system. European governance incrementally departs from the citizen, both at the Member state and
the European level. Transparency in the sense of making public the votes on decisions already taken
might be a precondition, but is far from being a sufficient means of bringing politics back to the
people. As one of us has argued elsewhere(106), the European Union is particularly remote from its
citizens and only provides for indirect and informal opportunity structures for citizen participation.
The attempt by the Italian and Austrian governments to trigger discussion in the IGC on direct
involvement of the citizens in EU politics(107) remained without success. Although these are crucial
questions of a 'post-national democracy'(108), the Amsterdam Treaty did not touch them at all.
All in all, the state of democracy of the Union was indeed improved by shifting the balance towards
the EP, but only in a rather formal sense. Democracy at both the national and the European level has
still a long way to go.
Endnotes
(*) An earlier and much different version of this paper – which was restricted to the analysis of those
Treaty changes affecting the EP – was presented at the IPSA seminar „Amsterdam and Beyond: The
European Union Facing the Challenges of the 21st Century", July 9-12, 1997, at the European
Parliament, Brussels; this paper also draws on our contribution made to Stefan Griller/Dimitri
Droutsas/Gerda Falkner/Katrin Forgó/Michael Nentwich, Regierungskonferenz 1996: Der Vertrag
von Amsterdam in der Fassung des Gipfels vom Juni 1997, Working Paper of the Forschunginstitut
für Europafragen n· 27, July 1997 (available by email order to david@fgr.wu-wien.ac.at).
(1) CONF/4001/97 final of 19. 6. 1997; on 8. 7. 1997 a revised version was published
(CONF/4002/97) where typing errors and some language inconsistencies are rectified and some
missing declarations inserted; on 25. 7. 1997, the 'final version' was published (CONF/4004/97): here
the reuslts of the IGC are already presented in a treaty format, prepared for signature at the special
summit in Amsterdam in October 1997; the latest document is best available through the WWW:
http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/treaty/treaty.htm. In this paper, we refer to document CONF/4004/97.
(2) Thanks to Michael Shackleton, EP, for this argument.
(3) But see chapter VI. 
(4) Information given by Andrea Pierucci, European Commission.
(5) It seems furthermore plausible that cases of parliamentary non-decision in the 2nd reading will in
fact rather point at an overall positive than to a hostile appreciation of the common position by the
EP: those MEPs who are definitely against the measure as shaped by the Council will rather ask for
far-reaching amendments than block EP decision-taking – since the blockade directly leads to the
adoption of the unwanted act. The only realistic scenario in which no decision might be taken in the
EP seems when an overwhelming majority of MEPs is either for an approval right away or for
amendments. Then, neither the absolute majority of votes cast (for the approval) nor the absolute
majority of MEPs (for the amendments) might be reached because those who fully agree know that
their preferred outcome is the default solution. They might therefore not be ready to compromise. In
addition, it is quite likely that there will be a majority for at least some (minor) amendments and thus
a decision. The EP's practise during the last few years shows that it was always successful in
rendering opinions in due time. The pressure put on the EP is obviously big: its reputation is at stake!
The EP can hardly press for participation in the legislative process when it fails to fulfil its attributed
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(6) Note: The COREPER decided on 10. 7. 1997 that all numbers of Articles in the TEC and TEU
will be renumbered; in document CONF/4004/97 from 25. 7. 1997, this decision was already put into
effect: Article 12 para. 1 of the Treaty of Amsterdam reads as follows: „The articles, titles and
sections of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
as amended by the provisions of this Treaty, shall be renumbered in accordance with the table of
equivalences set out in an Annex to this Treaty, which shall form an integral part thereof." In this
paper, we shall indicate the new article number in [square brackets] after the current number.
(7) Which might eventually be challenged before the ECJ, either via the Article 173 [= 230 new]
TEC procedure by challenging the final result for procedural shortcomings, or via Article 175 [= 232
new] (failure to act in infringement of the Treaty).
(8) There are, however, a few exceptions of this rule (see Articles 189 [= 251 new] para. 1, 172 [=
229 new], 184 [= 241 new], and 190 [= 253 new] TEC). All of those cases, however, contain no
specific power to act but are general provisions.
(9) The exact number depends on the way one counts; the sub-categories mainly accounted for
variations in the majority applicable in the Council and the various bodies consulted.
(10) See Article K.6 [= 34 new] para. 2 TEU.
(11) Article 228 [= 300 new] para. 3 TEC.
(12) See the new Article K.11 [= 39 new] para. 1 TEU.
(13) See the new title in the TEC on 'Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free
movement of persons' which includes the Community's competence e.g. to take limited emergency
measures against immigration or to decide on uniform visa rules; see Articles D/73l [= 64 new] and
G/73o [= 67 new] of the new title.
Note: In the document CONF/4001/97 the articles of new titles of the EC-Treaty did not have their
final number yet, but were numbered with capital letters (e.g. „Article D") or numbers beginning
with „1" (e.g. „Article 4" of the new title on employment); in the latest document, CONF/4004/97,
these new provisions were inserted at the appropriate place in the EC-Treaty and received a number
followed by a small letter (e.g. „Article 73l"); in this paper, we also give the „old" capital letter for
those who have the document 4001 only, followed by a slash and the „intermediate" number; As
announced in footnote , you find the final „new" number in [square brackets].
(14) See Article G/73o [= 67 new] para. 2 of the new title on the free movement of persons in the
TEC.
(15) New Article 5a [= 11 new] para. 2 TEC. 
(16) New Article 6a [= 13 new] TEC. 
(17) Articles D/73l [= 64 new] and G/73o [= 67 new] of the new title on movement of persons; see
above in the text close to footnote 13. 
(18) Article 129 [= 152 new] para. 4 TEC.
(19) The EP's position during the IGC as formulated by its two representatives, Elisabeth Gigou and
Elmar Brok, seemed to have been that at least decisions in principle, but not the day-to-day business
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(20) This is because the agricultural policy is an exclusive competence of the Community, financed
in integrum by the EC budget; furthermore, the decisions in the Council are taken by qualified
majority; therefore the national parliaments wishing to influence the decision taken at the EC level by
binding their agricultural minister may be unsuccessful in case their minister is being outvoted in the
Council (on this point see below Chapter IV).
(21) Article 99 [= 93 new] TEC.
(22) Directive 76/207/EEC, OJ 76/L 39/40; in its Report on the Operation of the Treaty on European
Union of 6.4.1995, Annex VIII, the Council counted 86 cases in the period 1992 to spring 1995
where Article 235 [= 308 new] TEC was used, in areas such as the establishment of a number of
bodies; in financial issues; and in other areas as varied as the consolidation of existing Community
legislation and the Community trade mark, and budgetary discipline.
(23) Note: The number one gets when looking at the list included in the draft version of the
Amsterdam Treaty (in document CONF/4001/97 as well as in the revised version CONF/4002/97) is
23; however, in one case mentioned in that list, namely Article 56 [= 46 new] para. 2 TEC on the
co-ordination of provisions for special treatment for foreign nationals with regard to their right of
establishment, it seems that the new Treaty does indeed not change anything with respect to the
procedure: codecision as well as qualified majority voting were already introduced by the Maastricht
Treaty. If one includes Article G/73o [= 67 new] para. 3 of the new title on the free movement of
persons which will apply in five years only, one has to add another case (thus the number 23 in
brackets).
(24) See the list in Annex V(b) of the 1995 Council report (footnote 22).
(25) New Article 5a [= 11 new] para. 3 TEC.
(26) Article D/73l [= 64 new] new title on movement of persons. 
(27) Article 4/109q [= 128 new] para. 4 new title on employment. 
(28) New Article 118b [= 139 new] para. 2. 
(29) Article 130i [= 166 new] para. 2. 
(30) Article 236 [= 309 new] new. 
(31) New Article 228 [= 300 new] para. 2. 
(32) As an exception from this general rule, Article 228 [= 300 new] para. 3 subpara. 2 TEC provides
for a right of assent of the EP in cases of the conclusion of agreements with international
organisations, or other agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising
cooperation procedures, agreements having important budgetary implications for the Community and
agreements entailing amendment of an act adopted under the procedure referred to in Article 189b [=
251 new]. 
(33) See e.g. Articles 103 [= 99 new], 103a [= 100 new], 104c [= 104 new], and 109c [= 114 new]
TEC.
(34) OJ 93/C 331/1 of 7/12/1993; see also the EP Resolution 17 May 1995, PE 190.441, pt. 34.
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(36) It should be mentioned, however, that the EP has to give its assent to the admission of a new
member and therefore, indirectly, to those Treaty changes that are necessary in order to incorporate
the new member in the Treaty framework (see Article O TEU).
(37) See e.g. Gerda Falkner/Michael Nentwich, European Union: Democratic Perspectives After
1996, Service Fachverlag: Vienna 1995, 79 ff, with further references. (abstract)
(38) Subpara. 1 of the Declaration on the Commission mentioned in the text.
(39) Subpara. 3 of the Declaration on the Commission mentioned in the text.
(40) Santer: CFSP; Broek: CFSP; Pinheiro: Lomé, ACP; Marin: Mediterranean states, Near and
Middle East, Latin America, parts of Asia; Brittan: Commonwealth, foreign commercial relations;
Bonino: humanitarian aid. 
(41) This has to be seen in the context of the envisaged new Troika between the Presidency, the High
Representative for the CFSP, and the external affairs Commissioner, see below footnote 104.
(42) Article 158 [= 214 new] para. 2 subpara. 1 new TEC.
(43) Article 158 [= 214 new] para. 2 subpara. 2 new TEC: „The governments of the Member States
shall, by common accord with the nominee for President, nominate...".
(44) Simon Hix, Executive Selection in the European Union: A Critical Reflection on the
Commission President Investiture Procedure, Paper prepared for the IPSA seminar „Amsterdam and
Beyond: The European Union Facing the Challenges of the 21st Century", July 9-12, 1997, at the
European Parliament, Brussels.
(45) He proposes to either prevent national parties from controlling the selection of MEPs or,
alternatively, to allow the EP to 'go first' in the investiture process.
(46) EP Resolution 17 May 1995, PE 190.441, pt. 22.iii. 
(47) Now Article 2 of the Decision 76/787/ECSC/EEC/Euratom of the Council, 20/9/76, OJ 76/L
278/1, last amendment: OJ 94/C 241/22.
(48) Presidency conclusions of the Amsterdam Summit, 16/17 June 1997.
(49) In his solemn piece The European Parliament, European Integration, Democracy and
Legitimacy, published e.g. in J.V. Louis/D. Waelbroeck, Le Parlement Européen dans l'Evolution
Institutionelle (Etudes Européennes, 1988).
(50) For a complete review of these proposals (mainly from French politicians) see Falkner/Nentwich
(footnote 37), 94 ff.
(51) CONF/2500/96, 5/12/1996; for an analytical summary of the Dublin-II-Paper see
Griller/Droutsas/Falkner/Forgó/Nentwich, Regierungskonferenz 1996: Der Vertragsentwurf der
irischen Präsidentschaft, Working Paper of the Forschungsinstitut für Europafragen n· 25, January
1997 (available by email order to david@fgr.wu-wien.ac.at).
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specific matters of common interest. The meetings used to be prepared on the basis of a
questionnaire sent by the organising parliament in order to broaden available information and focus
the debate. More recently, this body has also held for debates with the Ministers of the country
presiding over the Council of Ministers, thus offering a unique opportunity to many national
representatives. The number of such meetings increased substantially (to 25 between 1991-1994), as
did the number of bilateral meetings between specific rapporteurs or committees [a Commission
Report gives the number of 44 meetings between different bodies belonging to national and
European parliaments in 1993, see SEC(95) 731, 16].
(53) This includes the Schengen acquis and rules on visa, asylum, and immigration.
(54) A declaration (n° 13) to the Maastricht Treaty already envisages timely forwarding of the
legislative proposals; expanding this text and transforming it into a Protocol with a higher legal value
than a Declaration may be seen as a symbol of recognition of the more far-reaching debates that
preceded the IGC.
(55) On this discussion see e.g. Falkner/Nentwich (footnote 37), 89 f.
(56) To that effect, Protocol 16 annexed to the TEU will be repealed.
(57) Article 198b [= 264 new] para. 2 new TEC.
(58) Article 198c [= 265 new] subpara. 1 new and new subpara. 4 TEC.
(59) Article 198a [= 263 new] subpara. 3 new TEC.
(60) Falkner/Nentwich (footnote 37), 90 f.
(61) Article 130o [= 172 new] para. 1 new TEC.
(62) Before under the Social Agreement only in force for 14 Member states. 
(63) Articles B para. 1, c, and E of the Schengen Protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.
(64) New Article F.1 [= 7 new] para. 1 TEU.
(65) New Article 6a [= 13 new] TEC.
(66) Article 113 [= 133 new] para. 5 new TEC.
(67) Article 138 [= 190 new] para. 4 new TEC.
(68) Article 228 [= 300 new] para. 2 supara. 2 new TEC.
(69) National parliaments de facto do not have the capacity to control the supranational
decision-making because of the sheer amount of EU legislation to 'digest' in addition to their national
'home work'; furthermore, even decision-making under the unanimity requirement is often
supranational in nature (package deals and strong pressure to comply with an overwhelming
majority) and cannot be sufficiently controlled at distance; see e.g. Falkner/Nentwich (footnote 37),
100 ff and 120.
(70) New Article 4/109q [= 128 new] of the new Title on employment in the TEC.
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(72) Article 130o [= 172 new] para. 1 new TEC.
(73) Namely the old case of the cultural policy (Article 128 [= 151 new] TEC) and three new
provisions: measures facilitating the exercise of the right to move (Article 8a [= 18 new] para. 2 new
TEC); in the field of social security of migrant workers (Article 51 [= 42 new] new TEC); and the
co-ordination of national provisions with respect to activities of the self-employed (Article 57 [= 47
new] para. 2 new TEC).
(74) See e.g. Falkner/Nentwich (footnote 37) 123 f, with further references.
(75) See above A.; cf. Table 1.
(76) Article J.13 [= 23 new] para. 1 new TEU.
(77) Article K.6 [= 34 new] para. 2 lit. C new TEU.
(78) New Article 5a [= 11 new] para. 2 TEC.
(79) New Article K.12 [= 40 new] para. 2 TEU.
(80) Article J.13 [= 23 new] para. 2 new TEU; these decisions are thus secured twice: by the
double-qualified majority and by the 'Amsterdam Compromise'.
(81) The relevant part of the Council conclusions of the 28-29.1.1969 special meeting in
Luxembourg reads as follows: „Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote
on a proposal of the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the
Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be
adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting their mutual interests and those of the
Community, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty." There was however disagreement on the
consequences of not reaching a compromise – the Accords continue: „With regard to the preceding
paragraph, the French delegation considers that where very important interests are at stake the
discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached. The six delegations note that
there is a divergence of views on what should be done in the event of a failure to reach complete
agreement." See e.g. Anthony L. Teasdale, The Life and Death of the Luxembourg Compromise, 31
Journal of Common Market Studies (1993), 567-579.
(82) It is plausible that these might e.g. be anticipated popular resistance, or international obligations
specific to e.g. a neutral Member state. 
(83) This was always a much debated question in legal circles. It seems that, in the end, the
mainstream of European lawyers agreed that the Compromise never had any legal value and that in
case of a decision taken despite the opposition of one member state the latter could not challenge the
decision before the ECJ; see e.g. Teasdale (footnote ), 578 citing the ECJ ruling UK vs. Council,
Case 68/86 (from 23/2/1988, [1988] ECR 855) that „the rules regarding the manner in which the
Community institutions arrive at their decisions are laid down in the Treaty and are not at the
disposal of the Member states or of the institutions themselves" (pt. 38).
(84) OJ 93/L 304/1 as amended by OJ 95/L 31/14.
(85) See Article 7 (5) of the Rules of Procedure and the Annex defining when the Council acts as a
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(86) See Agence Europe, 6 July 1994, 9.
(87) See Article 5 (1).
(88) OJ 93/L 340/41.
(89) See e.g. Agence Europe, 25 May 1994, 12.
(90) See e.g. in Falkner/Nentwich (footnote 37), 132 ff.
(91) Article A [= 1 new] subpara. 2 new TEU.
(92) „Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office
in a Member state" are entitled to this right.
(93) New Article 191a [= 255 new] para. 1 TEC.
(94) In a Declaration to the Final Act it is provided that these principles and conditions will include a
rule that allows a Member state to request the Commission or the Council (but not the EP) not to
communicate to third parties a document originating from that state without its prior agreement.
(95) New Article 191a [= 255 new] para. 2 and 3 TEC.
(96) See Article 151 [= 207 new] para. 3 subpara. 2 new TEC.
(97) This only reaffirms what the Council has already done in the annex to its 1993 rules of
procedure (see footnote 84). 
(98) Article 5 para. 1 and Article 9 para. 1 3rd intent of the Council's rules of procedure.
(99) Article 7 para. 5 of the Council's rules of procedure.
(100) See e.g. Wolfgang Wessels, The EC Council: The Community's Decision-making Center, in:
Keohane/Hoffmann (Eds.) The New European Community, Westview Press 1991, 147.
(101) Joint cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94, Denkavit Internationaal B.V. et al vs.
Bundesamt für Finanzen, ruling of 17.10.1996, pt. 29.
(102) But see the 1994-96 discussions with a view to the IGC, summarised in Falkner/Nentwich
(footnote 37), 37 ff.
(103) See e.g. the White paper on the 1996 intergovernmental conference, Vol. 1: Official texts of
the European Union institutions, by the EP's IGC Task Force, January 1996 (Political Series W-18).
(104) With a view to a more efficient and coherent action in the field of foreign policy, the
Amsterdam Treaty replaces the old Troika (i.e. the former, the present, and the next Presidency of the
Council) by a new team: the present Council Presidency, the Commissioner responsible for foreign
affairs (see above chapter IV.A.; according to the new Article J.17 [= 27 new] TEU the Commission
shall be 'fully associated' with the work carried out in the CFSP field), and the new High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (i.e. the Secretary-General of the
Council). The latter shall assist the Council in matters of the CFSP, „in particular through
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appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting
political dialogue with third parties" (new Article J.16 [= 26 new] TEU). Furthermore, the new
Troika will be assisted by a new CFSP 'policy planning and early warning unit' within the Council
General Secretariat. It remains to be seen whether these new institutional arrangements will make
CFSP more efficient and coherent. Again, it seems that a first step only has been taken at
Amsterdam. 
(105) Cf. M.P.C.M. van Schendelen, 'The Council Decides': Does the Council Decide, JCMS 4/1996,
531-548 (542).
(106) Michael Nentwich, Opportunity Structures for Citizen Participation – The Case of the
European Union, Essex Occasional Papers in Government, N· 116, January 1997, also: European
Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 0 (1996), N· 1996-001,
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1996-001a.htm.
(107) See CONF/3941/96 of 3.10.1996.
(108) Edgar Grande, Demokratische Legitimation und europäische Integration, Leviathan 3/1996,
339-360; cf. also Michael Zürn, Über den Staat und die Demokratie im europäischen
Mehrebenensystem, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 1/1996, 27-55. 
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List of the new or altered EU decision-making procedures
according to the Draft Treaty of Amsterdam (CONF/4001,
4004/97)
Article
Competence
MS
Right
to
pro-
pose
Majority in
COUNCIL
Involvement of
EP Consultation
Changes
CONF/
4004/97
CONF/
4001/97 qual. unan. Cons. Cod. Ass. ESC RegC
EU-Treaty
7 I F.1 I
Breach of Union's
principles:
determination
 1/3    –      +     new
7 II F.1 II
Breach of Union's
principles:
Suspension of rights
deriving from TEU
   –         new
7 III F.3 III
Breach of Union's
principles: Alteration
or revoking of
measures
   –         new
34 II a &
b & d.1
K.6 II a & b
& d.1
Justice & Police:
Com. positions;
framework decisions
(approx. of laws);
conventions
 1    ~        
new / prev.
K.3/K.4; EP
different
34 II c K.6 II c Justice & Police: all
other decisions  1 10    ~        
prev.
K.3/K.4;
Council
unanimity,
EP different
34 II d.2 K.6 II d.2
Justice & Police:
Implementing
measures to
conventions
 1  *    ~        
new / prev.
K.3/K.4: EP
different
40 II K.12 II
Justice & Police:
Authorisation to
closer cooperation
 1
COM-C
AC      
new / prev.
K.7; see Art
[2]
Flexibility
40 III K.12 III
Justice & Police:
Joining of closer
cooperation
 J
COM-O  x         new
41 III K.13 III
J&P: Charging of
operational costs not
to EU budget or not
accord. to GNP-scale
woCOM        
procedural as
K.8, but
changed
competence
42 K.14 Justice & Police:
Transfer to TEC  1          
prev. K.9;
role EP new
23 I J.13 I
CFSP: Basic
decisions and other
decisions than
implementing
measures
 1    q  ¢        
prev.
standard
unanimity
1 of 9 26.10.97 19:06
EIoP: Text 1997-015: Tables http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-015t.htm23 II J.13 II CFSP: Implementing
measures  1 10
AC      
prev.
unanimity
24 J.14
CFSP: Opening of
negotiations;
agreements with third
countries or Int.
Organisations
 1         new
28 III J.18 III
CFSP: Charging of
operational costs not
to EU budget or not
acRegCd. to
GNP-scale
woCOM        
procedural as
J.11, but
changed
competence
Prot.
Schengen
2 I
Prot.
Schengen
B I
Implementation;
choice of legal base
for Schengen acquis;
entry into force
     --       new
Prot.
Schengen
3
Prot.
Schengen
C
Participation of UK
and Ireland  J    --
#       new
Prot.
Schengen
5 I
Prot.
Schengen
E I
Agreement with
Norway and Iceland      --       new
Prot.
Schengen
5 II
Prot.
Schengen
E II
Agreement EU with
N/Ice/UK/Irl             new
Prot.
Schengen
6
Prot.
Schengen
F
Transfer of Schengen
secretariat         new
EC-Treaty
11 II 5a II
Authorisation to
closer cooperation
TEC
 
AC
        new
11 III 5a III
Joining closer
cooperation TEC
 J
COM-O
 e
x
        new
12 II 6 II Prohibition of
discrimination
            prev.
cooperation
13 6a
Measures against
racial etc.
discrimination
            new
18 8a II Facilitating exercise
of right to move
            prev. assent
42 51 Social security of
migrant workers
     a         prev. EP not
involved
47 II 57 II
Activities of
self-employed
(co-ordination)
            prev.
consultation 
64 II [Pers. D] 73l
II
Limited emergency
measures against
immigration
           new
67 I [Pers. G] 73o
I
Decisions
Asylum/Immigration/
control of persons
except Visa
1
          new, only for
5 years
67 II 1 [Pers. G] 73o
II 1
Decisions
Asylum/Immigration/
control of persons COM-D
 
 
        new,
applicable in
5 years
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67 II 2 [Pers. G] 73o
II 2
Transfer of decisions
to Art 189b
            new, applic.
in 5 years
67 III
and 62 II
b ii & iv
[Pers. G] 73o
III and [B]
73j II b ii &
iv
Uniform visa rules;
uniform visa issuing
procedures in member
states
             new,
applicable in
5 years
71 I 75 I General transport
policy          x
prev.
cooperation;
consultation
RegC new
80 84 See and air transport          x  
prev.
cooperation
128 II
[Employment
4]
109q II
Guidelines  
 a
      new
128 IV
[Employment
4]
109q IV
Recommendations to
member states COM-R
        new
129
[Employment
5]
109r
Incentive measures;
pilot projects
 
 a
      new
130
[Employment
6]
109r
Setting-up of
employment
committee
woCOM  e
          new
133 V 113 V
Extension of
competence in CCP
to services and
intellectual property
            new
135 [Customs]
116
Strengthening
customs cooperation             new
137 II 118 II
Directives in the
social field according
to Art 118 I; combat
social exclusion
        Social
Agreement
Art 2; RegC
new
137 III 118 III
Directives in the
social field according
to Art 118 III
        Social
Agreement
Art 2; RegC
new
139 II 1 118b II 1
Implementation of
social partners'
agreements according
to Art 118 I
          Social
Agreement
Art 4
139 II 2 118b II 2
Implementation of
social partners'
agreements according
to Art 118 III
          Social
Agreement
Art 4
141 III 119 III
measures to ensure
equal opportunities
etc.
          new
148 125
Implementing
decisions relating to
ESF
       
 x
prev. coop.;
RegC new
150 IV 127 IV Vocational Training          x
prev. coop.;
RegC new
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a&b 129 IV a&b
Standards of organs,
blood etc.; veterinary
medicine and
phytosanitary
measures
        prev. Art 43,
consultation;
ESC, RegC
new
156 III 129d III
Transeuropean
networks: other
measures
       
 x  x
prev.
cooperation
162 130e
Regional Fund:
implementing
decisions
       
 x  x
prev.
cooperation
166 I 130i I Research framework
programmes
       x    x   prev.
unanimity
166 II 130i II
Adapting or
supplementing
programmes
          new
172 I 130o I
Setting-up of joint
undertakings in R&T
development
   
 x
   
 x
  prev.
unanimity
172 II 130o II Research cooperation          x   prev.
cooperation
175 I 130s I
Environmental policy
in general
       
 x
prev.
cooperation;
RegC new
175 II 130s II
Environmental policy:
taxes, development
plans etc.
       
 x
RegC new
175 III 130s III Environmental policy:
action programmes
        RegC new
179 130w
Development
cooperation 
            prev.
cooperation
190 IV 138 IV
Regulation of
conditions governing
performance of duties
of MEPs
       
><
    new (prev.
Art 141 EP
rules of
procedure)
214 II 158 II
Nomination of
Commission
President
   
()
        prev.
consultation
255 II 191a II
Determination of
right to access to
documents
            new
262 I 198b II
Rules of Procedure of
Regional Committee
          prev.
unanimity in
CL, now
RegC alone
280 209a Measures countering
fraud
        CA   new
285 213a
Measures for the
production of
statistics
            new
286 213b
Setting-up of data
protection
supervisory body
            new
299 II 227 II
Application of TEC
to outermost regions
            prev.
unanimity,
no
involvement
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300 II 2 228 II 2
International
agreements:
suspension;
establishment of a
Union's internat.
position
        new
309 II 236 II Suspension of rights
deriving from TEC
   –         new
309 III 236 III Alteration or revoking
of measures
   –         new
Legend:
Article:
[ ] 
number of article will be changed in final version of the Treaty of Amsterdam. This Table will
be updated as soon as the new numbering system is known. 
Pers. 
New Title „Free movement of persons, asylum and immigration" 
Prot. 
Protocol
Right to propose:
1 
Right to propose by single member states 
1/3 
Right to propose of one third of the member states 
J 
Application of the joining member state 
COM-C 
Commission has no right to propose but is invited by the Council to give an opinion 
woCOM 
Commission has no right to propose 
COM-R 
not „proposal" but „recommendation" of the Commission 
COM-D 
Commission has to deal with demand for proposal by MS 
COM-O 
Commission issues opinion
Council of Ministers:
– 
vote of state concerned does not count in the Council 
* 
majority of two thirds of High Contracting Parties to the convention 
10 
at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members 
e 
simple majority of members 
AC 
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-- 
only participating member states may vote 
# 
applying member state may also vote 
q 
abstention qualified to the effect that MS is not bound by decision (only if max. 1/3 of all MS) 
( ) 
not Council as organ but „Governments of the Member states" decide
European Parliament:
+ 
two third majority of votes cast and majority of MEPs 
~ 
Council may lay down time limit for opinion of the EP (not less than 3 months); In the absence
of an opinion within that time-limit, the Council may act 
¢ 
Consultation by Presidency on the main aspects and basic choices 
>< 
EP decides with simple majority after unanimous assent of the Council and after opinion of the
Commission
Others:
CA 
opinion of the Court of Auditors 
x 
not clear on the basis of the Draft Treaty because final wording of the text lacks
Table II
Proportional distribution of seats in the EP with a minimum of
three seats (EU 15)
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Member
State  Population 
% of EU-
Popu-
lation 
present
# of
MEPs 
new #
of MEPs  Diff.  new #
of MEPs  Diff. 
Germany  81.600.000  21,98  99  3 + 128 = 131  +32  137  +38 
United Kingdom  58.000.000  15,63  87  3 +91 = 94  +7  97  +10 
France  58.000.000  15,63  87  3 +91 = 94  +7  97  +10 
Italy  57.200.000  15,41  87  3 +90 = 93  +6  96  +9 
Spain  39.600.000  10,67  64  3 +62 = 65  +1  67  +3 
Netherlands  15.500.000  4,17  31  3 +24 = 27  –4  26  -5 
Greece  10.500.000  2,83  25  3 +16 = 19  –6  18  -7 
Belgium  10.100.000  2,72  25  3 +16 = 19  –6  17  -7 
Portugal  9.800.000  2,64  25  3 +15 = 18  –7  16  -7 
Sweden  8.800.000  2,37  22  3 +14 = 17  –5  15  -7 
Austria  7.800.000  2,10  21  3 +12 = 15  –6  13  -8 
Denmark  5.200.000  1,40  16  3 + 8 = 11  –5  9  -7 
Finland  5.100.000  1,37  16  3 + 8 = 11  –5  9  -7 
Ireland  3.600.000  0,97  15  3 + 6 = 9  –6  6  -9 
Luxembourg  400.000  0,11  6  3 + 0 = 3  –3  3  -3 
Total  371.200.000  100,00  626  626  626 
average # of citizens per MEP according to state (w/o
Lux.): 623.000-400.000 613.000-591.000
total average # of citizens per MEP: 593.000
Rules:
I. 
„give every country 3 seats and distribute the remaining seats (581) among all according to
population" 
II. 
„give Luxembourg 3 seats and distribute the remaining seats (623) among the other 14
according to population"
Figure 1
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